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RECENT DECISIONS
Real Party in Interest - Mother as Necessary Party in Suit for
Wages of Minor - The plaintiff brought suit under the Fair Labor
Standards Act for minimum wages, overtime, liquidated damages and
attorney's fees, arising from work performed for the defendant by
the plaintiff's minor sons. The court held that the plaintiff could
bring the action in his own name, since the father is the real party
in interest, to recover for the work done by an unemancipated minor.
Because of a statute in South Carolina making the wife equal to her
husband in the matters of custody and control of services and earnings
of minors, the court held further that the mother was also a real
party in interest and a necessary party to the action. The plaintiff
was directed to amend the complaint to make the mother a party
plaintiff. Constance v. Gosnell, 62 F. Supp. 253, (1945, South Caro-
lina).
The right of the father to collect the wages of his minor child,
as a corollary to his duty to support and provide for the minor, is
unquestioned.' If the minor is unemancipated, it makes no difference
that he contracted to do the work in his own name or on his own
terms.2
The status of the mother as a party in interest is not so settled
or so clear. At common law the father had the predominate right
and the mother's rights were regarded as in abeyance during the
father's life.3 She could sue for the child's earnings only in the
absence of the father through death or desertion, and where she had
the burden of support.4
The interesting aspect of this case arises from the statute equal-
izing the rights of parents with regard to their children in South
Carolina, a type of statute which has become more and more com-
mon in recent years.5 The South Carolina statute interpreted in this
case reads as follows:
The husband and wife are the joint natural guardians of
their minor children and are equally charged with their welfare
and education, and the care and management of their estates;
and the wife and husband shall have equal power, rights and
duties, and neither parent has any right paramount to the right
I Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N. H. 476, 145 A. 782, 63 A. L. R. 1142,(1929); Schonberger v. Culbertson et al, 247 N. Y. S. 180, 231 App. Div.
257, (1931); Patek v. Plankinton Packing Co., 179 Wis. 442, 190 N. W. 920,(1923).2 Wardrobe v. Miller, 53 Cal. App. 370, 200 P. 77, (1921) ; Darling v. Noyes, 32
Iowa 96, (1871) ; Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Cope, 132 Okla. 152, 269 P. 1084, 60
A. L. R. 837, (1928).
3 32 Am. Jur. 599, Par. 11.
4 32 Am. Jur. 599, Par. 11.
5 Revised Code of Delaware, (1935), 3576-78; Revised Statutes of Maine, (1944),
Chap. 153, Sec. 16-17; Revised Statutes of Missouri, (1939), 375; Pennsylvania
Statutes, (Purdon's 1936), Title 48, Sec. 91.
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of the other concerning the custody of the minor or the control
of the services or the earnings of such minor or any other
matter affecting the minor . . . Nothing herein contained shall
be construed to relieve the father of his common law obligation
to support his children, nor shall it be construed to increase the
liability of the mother to support the children.6
The court in this case considered that this statute so enlarged
the rights of the wife that she became a necessary party to the
action. It may be expected however that courts will be reluctant
to give such complete effect to this type of statute, especially since
it is still true that the father generally supports the family. A
number of state courts have held under such statutes that the wife
is a proper party to the action for the minor's wages and may be
joined in such an action.7 The question in this case as to whether
the wife is a necessary party appears to have arisen in only one
instance, a Minnesota case,8 where the Minnesota statute9 analagous
to the above quoted law of South Carolina was interpreted. In this
case the father sued for loss of the services of a child who had
been injured. The contention of the defendant that the mother was
a necessary party to the action was rejected. The court stressed
the fact that the statute made no change in the rule of common
law placing the whole burden of support upon the father. In the
instant case the South Carolina Court reached the opposite conclusion,
even though the statute expressly preserved the common law situation
as to the duty of support. It is submitted that the courts generally
should not require the wife to be a necessary party unless and
until she is placed by statute upon an equal basis with her husband
as to the burden of support.
This case also involved the subsidiary question as to whether
the liquidated damages provided for by the Fair Labor Standards
Act in an amount equal to the unpaid wages were items for which
6 Code of Laws of South Carolina. (1942), 8638.
7Hare v. Dean, 90 Maine 308, 38 A. 227, (1897) ; Thomas v. St. Louis I. M. & S.
Ry. Co., 180 S. W. 1030, (1915); Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N. H.
576, 145 A. 782, 63 A. L. R. 1142, (1929).
8 Ackert v. City of Minneapolis, 129 Minn. 190, 151 N. W. 976 at 978, L. R. A.
1915D, (1915) in which the court says: "Defendant insists that both parents are
equally entitled to the custody of them, and that it follows as a consequence
that they are jointly entitled to the benefit of the services of the children and
must bring a joint action to recover for the loss of such services. This conten-
tion is correct to some extent, but we think it was neither the purpose nor the
effect of these statutes to make any material change in the duty imposed upon
the husband and father to support and maintain his family.... Where he in
fact performs this duty ,we think he may maintain an action to recover for loss
of the services of his minor child."
9 Minnesota Statutes, (G.S. 1913), 7442. "The father and mother are the natural
guardians of their minor children, and, being themselves competent to transact
their own business and not otherwise unsuitable, they are equally entitled to
their custory and the care of their education."
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the father could recover.1 0 The classification of this portion of the
recovery sought has arisen in several cases under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and it has been held that the liquidated damages pro-
vided for are not a penalty, but are in the nature of wages."- The
decisions involved suits in the state courts where the additional amount
could not be recovered if a penalty, because jurisdiction in suits
for penalties resides exclusively in the federal courts1 2 In these cases
the courts held that the added amount was not a penalty and there-
fore subject to recovery in the state court. Presumably these decisions
are authority in support of the right of the father to collect the
liquidated damages due the child, and such right of the father was
upheld in the instant case.
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1029 U. S. C. A. 216; "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206
or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected
in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime com-
pensation, as the case may be, and an additional amount as liquidated damages."
1129 U. S. C. A. 216. Note 4; Maddox v. Jones, 42 Fed. Supp. 35 (1941); La
Guardia v. Austin-Bliss Gen. Tire Co. 41 F. Supp. 678 (1941) ; Forsyth v. Cent.
Foundry Co. 198 So. 706, 240 Ala. 277 (1940).
12 28 U. S. C. A. 371.

